Abstract Scarf's algorithm (Scarf, H. E. Econometrica 35, 50-69 1967) provides fractional core elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [4] showed that Scarf's algorithm can be extended for capacitated NTU-games. In this setting agents can be involved in more than one coalition at a time, cooperations may be performed with different intensities up to some limits, and the contribution of the agents can also differ in a coalition. The fractional stable solutions for the above model, produced by the extended Scarf algorithm, are called stable allocations. In this paper we apply this solution concept for the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC). This is one of the most important general stable matching problems due to its relevant applications, also well-known to be NP-hard. We show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns out to be integral then it provides a stable matching for an instance of HRC, so this method can be used as a heuristic. In an experimental study, we compare this method with other heuristics constructed for HRC that have been applied in practice in the American and Scottish resident allocation programs, respectively. Our main finding is that the Scarf algorithm outperforms all the other known heuristics when the proportion of couples is high.
Introduction
Mechanism design in matching markets dates back to the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [8] on college admissions. 1 They introduced the concept of stable matching, that is a fair solution where an application of a student can be rejected by a college only if its quota is filled with better candidates. Gale and Shapley gave an efficient algorithm to find a stable matching in this setting. It turned out [19] that the same method had already been used in the US resident matching program since 1952 (now called NRMP, see [19, 21, 24] ). This program was redesigned later [20] , partly because the organisers wanted to accommodate the wishes of couples. Since then couples can submit joint preference lists in order to avoid being matched to hospitals far from each other. However, for the Hospitals / Residents problem with couples (HRC) the existence of a stable matching is no longer guaranteed [19] . Moreover, the related decision problem is NP-hard [18] , therefore we need to use heuristics for large markets. There are many recent papers on this problem by economists [12] [13] [14] 20] , and by computer scientists [1, 15, 16, 23] as well, see also an interdisciplinary survey [6] . In particular, Biró et al. [5] compared some old and new heuristics for a setting that formerly featured in the Scottish resident allocation program [10] .
Another seminal paper in cooperative game theory is by Scarf [22] . He gave an algorithm to find a core element for any balanced NTU-game. Aharoni and Fleiner [2] used this algorithm to find stable fractional matchings for problems where the underlying graph is not necessarily bipartite. Biró and Fleiner [4] generalised this result by showing that Scarf's algorithm can be extended to find stable allocations for NTU-games where both the agents and their cooperations can have capacities, and even when agents have different contributions in a cooperation performed.
In this paper first we show that a restricted version of the HRC problem where couples may not apply for a pair of positions in the same hospital, can be reduced to an integral stable allocation problem (ISA) with no edge capacities, where we have a one-to-one correspondence between the stable solutions of the two models. Furthermore, we show that the general HRC problem (where couples may apply for a pair of positions in the same hospital) can be transformed into an integral stable allocation problem with contributions (ISAC) and with no edge capacities, where the stable solutions for the latter problem are stable solutions for the former. Biró and Fleiner [4] demonstrated that the original Scarf algorithm always returns a stable allocation for both the ISA and ISAC problems with no edge capacities, and whenever it outputs an integer solution it solves the problem. Therefore, the Scarf algorithm can be used as a heuristic to solve all of these problems, ISA, ISAC and HRC as well.
After this, we present an experimental study, that follows up the work by Biró, Irving and Schlotter [5] , where we compare the performance of the Scarf algorithm and other heuristics described in [20] and [5] . Our main finding is that the Scarf algorithm works very well if the proportion of couples is high. Although it is unrealistic to suppose that all the applicants form couples in a resident allocation program, there can be other applications with a similar feature. For instance, in the Hungarian higher education matching scheme [3] students can apply to pairs of teacher programmes, and they usually do so in a very concentrated way. This results in a very similar problem, as a student applying to pairs of programmes can be seen as a couple applying to pairs of positions. A similar situation occurred in the Scottish resident allocation scheme (SPA) from 2000 to 2005, where the medical doctors had to apply for two posts, a medical and a surgical one [9] , although the elicitation of their preferences was more restricted than in the Hungarian application.
Description of the models
First we present a model for the Hospitals / Residents problem with couples, similar to the one described by Biró, Irving and Schlotter [5] . Then we present the integral stable allocation problem with contributions by Biró and Fleiner [4] . Finally we describe the connections between some variants of these two problems, and a possible implementation of the Scarf algorithm for this setting together with an illustrative example.
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC)
In the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) we are given a set of applicants A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t } and a set of hospitals H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n h } with b(h p ) denoting the capacity of hospital h p . The set of applicants can be partitioned into single applicants S = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n s } and members of couples, where the set of couples is denoted by C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n c }. The agents in this model will be the hospitals, the single applicants and the couples. We denote the set of agents by Y = H ∪ S ∪ C, where |Y| = n = n h + n s + n c , and sometimes we will use notation y i ∈ Y for referring to a generic agent (i.e. hospital, single applicant or couple). The preference list of a single applicant a i ∈ S contains hospitals in the order of her preferences, whilst the preference list of couple (a i , a j ) ∈ C contains pairs of hospitals in the order of their joint preferences. An application of a single applicant to a hospital is referred to as a single application, whilst a joint application is made by a couple to a pair of hospitals. In our general model we allow a couple to apply for a pair of positions in the same hospital, in which case we refer to this application as a combined application. Let us denote a general single application by 
and undersubscribed otherwise. Finally we note that we can also accommodate the possibility that only one member of a couple applies for a position (and the other member remains unmatched) in our model by simply introducing a dummy hospital with no capacity constraint, which would correspond to the outside option.
To define stability we need to specify the preferences of the hospitals over the set of applications. We suppose that every hospital has a strict preference ordering over the acceptable applicants. From these rankings we will derive the definition of stability, that is a slight extension of the stability definition by Biró, Irving and Schlotter [5] . 2 The rationale behind this stability definition is described in [5] in detail. 3 We do not say that this is the only reasonable stability definition. However, as described in [5] and as we will also show in Section 2.4, this stability definition implies a natural preference ordering over the applications by the hospitals, and the choice functions expressed by the hospitals over the set of applications can be derived from these preferences in a responsive way. This is the key fact that ensures that this problem can be transformed to the ISAC model.
Couples problems under quota-responsive choice functions
In this subsection we show that the above defined HRC model can be described with a general matching with couples model, where the choice functions of the hospitals satisfy the so-called quota-responsive property. This property turns out to be crucial in proving the solvability of the HRC problem with the Scarf algorithm.
In a general model of matching with couples (see e.g. in [17] ), the hospitals have choice functions over the set of applications. Formally, let Ch h p denote the choice function of hospital h p , which means that from a set of applications X ⊆ E, Ch h p (X) is the set of chosen applications by h p . The choice function of a single applicant or a couple will simply select the best application from a set of applications. For a set of applications X, let X y i denote the applications in which agent y i is involved, where agent y i can be a single applicant, a couple or a hospital. A stable matching in this general setting can be defined as a set of applications X if Ch y i (X) = X y i and there exists no application e ∈ E \ X such that e ∈ Ch y i (X ∪ e) for each agent y i who is involved in e. The first condition means that the matching is individually rational and the second condition ensures the lack of a blocking coalition.
A choice function of a hospital is said to be quota-responsive 4 if it selects the chosen set in a greedy fashion. More precisely, for each choice function Ch h p we require that h p has a strict preference order over the applications it is involved in, denoted by ≺ h p , and from a set of applications h p greedily selects the best applications according to ≺ h p until the number of selected applicants would violate its quota. Note that if no combined applications are present then the hospital simply chooses the best quota-many applications from the set offered. However, if combined applications are allowed then some combined applications might be rejected in this greedy selection process when the hospital has only one position remaining, but the last slot of the hospital may be filled later by a single or joint application. 5
Proposition 2 The HRC problem is a matching with couples problem under quotaresponsive choice functions.
Proof For a given instance of HRC, we describe how to create a matching with couples problem with quota-responsiveness and then we show that stability for the HRC instance coincides with stability for quota-responsive choice functions. The strict preference ≺ h p over the set of applications of hospital h p is created as follows. The hospital preference between two single or joint applications is straightforwardly coming from its ranking over the applicants involved in those applications. Suppose now that hospital h p has to decide between two combined applications, say
, where a j is higher ranked than a i and a l is higher ranked than a k . In this case h p will decide according to the worst candidates of these couples, so it would prefer the first application if and only if a i is higher ranked than a k . Now, let us consider how the hospital chooses between a resident a i applying in a single or joint application and a pair of residents (a j , a k ) applying in a combined application, where a k is higher ranked by h p than a j . Again h p decides according to its ranking on the weakest candidates, so it will prefer the application involving a i if and only if a i is higher ranked than a j by h p . It is possible that indifferences occur in this preference order between two joint or combined applications from the same couple, for example, hospital h p would be indifferent between two joint applications
However, in this case we suppose that the hospital breaks these ties according to the couple's preferences. What remains is to verify that an application e is blocking for a matching M in the HRC context if and only if e is blocking for the corresponding set of applications X with regard to the above defined quota-responsive choice functions. This is obvious for single and joint applications. Regarding a combined application [(a i , a j ) → h p ], condition (g) of the HRC stability definition is satisfied if and only if h p selects this application when offered together with the set of applications X. To explain the latter point more carefully, we discuss the possible cases in details. When hospital h p has at least two empty slots left then it accepts the new combined application together with X. If h p has only one empty slot then it has to reject one application from X in order to accommodate the new combined application, where the rejected application either contains an applicant which is lower ranked than both of a i and a j or it is a less preferred application by couple (a i , a j ). Finally, if h p has no empty seat then either it has to reject another combined application (which contains an applicant that is lower ranked than both a i and a j ), or two single or joint applications (either each containing an applicant that is lower ranked than both a i and a j , or one of them being a joint application from couple (a i , a j ) that is less preferred by this couple).
Integral stable allocation problem with contributions
The stable allocation problem with contributions can be defined for hypergraphs as follows. Suppose that we are given a hypergraph H (V , E) and for each vertex v ∈ V (H ) a strict preference order over the edges incident with v, that corresponds to the preferences of the players over the contracts in which they can be involved, where e < v f denotes that player v prefers contract f to e. Furthermore, we introduce a contribution vector r e : V (H ) → R + for each edge e of the hypergraph that represents the contributions of the agents in contract e. We assume that v ∈ e if and only if r e (v) > 0, that is when agent v can contribute to contract e. Suppose that we are given nonnegative bounds on the vertices b : V (H ) → R + and nonnegative capacities on the edges c : E(H ) → R + . A nonnegative function x on the edges is an allocation if x(e) ≤ c(e) for every edge e and e:v∈e x(e)r e (v) ≤ b(v) for every vertex v. An allocation is stable if every unsaturated edge e (i.e., every edge e with x(e) < c(e)) contains a vertex v such that f :v∈f,e≤ v f x(f )r f (v) = b (v) . If the latter condition is satisfied for a vertex v then we say that edge e is dominated at vertex v. If an unsaturated edge is not dominated at any vertex then we say that this edge is blocking and the allocation is unstable. If every bound, capacity and contribution is integral and the problem is to find an integral stable allocation x then we refer to this problem as the integral stable allocation problem with contributions (ISAC). Finally, if we allow unit contributions only then we get the integral stable allocation problem (ISA).
Biró and Fleiner [4] showed that every stable allocation problem with contributions has a solution that can be obtained by the extended Scarf algorithm. Furthermore, if we have no capacities on the edges then the existence of a stable allocation is guaranteed by the original Scarf lemma, and one stable allocation can be obtained by the original Scarf algorithm.
The exact description of the Scarf algorithm can be found in [22] and its extension for ISAC is described in [4] . However, for the completeness of this paper, we also give a brief description in Section 2.5. But first we highlight some important facts of the Scarf algorithm (and its extension). The algorithm starts by perturbing the capacities (and also the preference matrix if there are ties in the preferences, which is not the case in our particular setting). Based on the perturbation, the Scarf algorithm is deterministic. It takes a well-defined pivot step in each round, which can be implemented efficiently, i.e. in polynomial time in the number of edges of the underlying hypergraph (the number of possible contracts). However, the number of pivot steps in the Scarf algorithm can be exponentially large, as the problem of finding a stable allocation is PPAD-hard even for unit bounds and capacities [11] (in which case the solution is also called stable fractional matching [2] ). Some related open questions are listed in [4] and also in the last section of this paper.
Connections between the models
In this subsection we show how the HRC problem can be reduced to an ISA or ISAC problem, depending whether combined applications are allowed. These results are based on the fact that the HRC problem is a special matching with couples problem under quota-responsive choice functions, as shown in Proposition 2. Therefore our results can be extended to these more general class of problems. First we consider the case when no combined applications are allowed.
Theorem 3 An instance of HRC with no combined applications can be reduced to an instance of ISA, where the set of stable matchings in the former problem is in one to one correspondence with the set of integral stable allocations in the latter.
Proof Suppose that we have an instance of HRC, as described in Section 2.1. We create an instance of ISA with no edge capacities as follows. Vertex set V of hypergraph H (V , E) represents the agents, namely the single applicants, couples and hospitals. The edges E of H (V , E) correspond to the applications (i.e. possible contracts). For a single application let the contribution of both the resident and the hospital in this contract be one, and similarly, in a joint application let the contributions of the couple and the two hospitals be one each. We set the bound of a vertex that corresponds to a hospital equal to the capacity of that hospital in the HRC problem.
The preferences of the vertices over the contracts in the ISA instance are the same as the preferences of the agents (i.e. single applicants, couples and hospitals) over the applications they are involved in, as defined in the proof of Proposition 2. It is now immediate to see the one-to-one correspondence between the set of stable matchings of the HRC instance and the set of integral stable allocations of the ISA instance: an application is accepted if and only if the corresponding edge has unit value in the stable allocation. A single or joint application is blocking in the HRC context if and only if it is blocking for the quota-responsive choice functions defined in the more general matching with couples setting if and only if the corresponding edge is blocking in the ISA instance.
Theorem 4 An instance of HRC can be transformed to an instance of ISAC, where the integral stable allocations for the latter problem correspond to the stable matchings for the former one.
Proof Suppose that we have an instance of HRC, as described in Section 2.1; we create an instance of ISAC as follows. In addition to the proof of Theorem 3, here we need to adjust our construction by accommodating the combined applications. A combined application is also represented by an edge in the hypergraph, where the contribution of the couple is one and the contribution of the hospital is two, since the couple applies for two positions at the hospital.
Here again the vertices in the ISAC instance that correspond to the hospitals should have the same strict preferences over the contracts which defined the quota-responsive choice functions over the set of applications, as described in the proof of Proposition 2. One can now verify that an integral stable allocation of the ISAC instance corresponds to a stable matching of the HRC instance, where the edges with unit values represent the accepted applications, since a blocking application for the HRC instance (which is also blocking for the more general matching with couples problem under quota-responsive choice functions) is a blocking edge in the ISAC instance as well. To clarify the latter conclusion more in details, we remind the reader that the agents with quota-responsive choice functions select the accepted applications in a greedy manner according to their underlying rankings over the applications. Therefore, if an application is blocking then each of the agents involved selects this application when offered together with their current applications in X, which means that each of these agents rejects at least one application from X. This implies that the corresponding edge in the ISAC instance is blocking, since it is not dominated at any vertex.
Note that the converse of the above theorem is not true. A stable matching for a HRC instance might not be an integral stable allocation for the corresponding ISAC instance. This is because in the HRC stability definition it is possible that a combined application is rejected as there is only one place left at a hospital, but a less preferred single or joint application is accepted for that last place. In particular, suppose that there is only one position at hospital h 1 and there is a combined application [(a 1 , a 2 ) → h 1 ] and a single one [a 3 → h 1 ], where the applicants are ranked according to their indices. Here the unique stable allocation is when the combined application is taken with half weight. However, the only stable matching is when a 3 is matched to h 1 . This stable matching cannot be translated to a stable allocation as the rejected combined application would emerge as a blocking edge. When combined applications are allowed then there may be different reasonable stability concepts. Our transformation described in Theorem 4 works as long as the hospitals can rank the applications, and from these strict preferences we may derive the hospitals' choice functions over the set of of applications in a quota-responsive way. The latter means that from a set of applications a hospital accepts the best applications one by one, as long as the acceptance of an application does not violate its quota.
Finally we note that if every hospital has one position only then we get a stable matching problem for a hypergraph [2] , that is also known as an NTU-game, which is almost a hedonic coalition formation game, except that a couple can apply to a pair of hospitals in two possible ways. It is worth mentioning that the NP-hardness results [5, 18] hold for this simple case as well.
An implementation of the Scarf algorithm for HRC
In this subsection we give a possible implementation of the Scarf algorithm for HRC to make the paper more self-contained; further details on this can be found in [4] . The following description of the Scarf Lemma [22] is due to Aharoni and Fleiner [2] (here [n] denotes the set of integers 1, 2, . . . , n, supp(x) denotes the support of x (i.e., the coordinates where x is strictly positive), and δ i,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise). 
Then there is a nonnegative vector x in R n+m +
such that Ax = b and the columns of C that correspond to supp(x) form a dominating set, that is, for any column
For a given instance of HRC, we now show a possible setting for matrices A and C such that a solution x of the above Scarf Lemma corresponds to a stable allocation of the corresponding instance of ISAC (and an integral solution x corresponds to a stable matching for the HRC problem). Let n = |Y| and m = |E|. For i ∈ [n], let row i and column i of matrices A and C correspond to agent y i ∈ Y, and for j ∈ [m], let column n + j correspond to application e j ∈ E. When ordering the agents we will take the single applicants first, followed by the couples and then by the hospitals. Let the n × m submatrix of A on the right side of A contain the contribution vectors of the applications, namely This setting satisfies the conditions of Scarf's Lemma. Furthermore, for an agent y i if contract e j does not involve y i then C i,n+j ≥ m, and if e j involves y i then C i,n+j < m with higher value when e j is more preferred by y i . Therefore we can show that supp(x) is a dominating set for a solution x if and only if it is also a stable allocation for the corresponding ISAC problem (see [4] for further details). Now we describe the execution of the Scarf algorithm, as described in [22] .
Scarf algorithm
The Scarf algorithm is an iterative algorithm where each phase consists of a pivot step and an ordinal step. Let x i denote the feasible solution (i.e. where Ax i = b) after the i-th pivot step, and for a feasible solution x i , let FB i = supp(x i ) be the feasible basis. At the beginning of the process we set FB 0 = [n], which means that initially we have x 0 (j ) = b j for each index j ∈ [n] (i.e. for each agent y j ∈ Y). We also maintain an ordinal basis, denoted by OB i after the i-th ordinal step. OB i always forms a dominating set, that is, for any column i ∈ [n + m] there is a row k ∈ [n] of C such that C k,i ≤ C k,j for any j ∈ OB i . Moreover, each of the columns in OB i has a row-minimal element in the submatrix of C restricted to these columns. Let q(i) denote the index of the row where column i has a row-minimum in this submatrix. During the execution of the algorithm the two bases will always share n − 1 coordinates and the algorithm will terminate whenever they coincide. Now we describe the initial ordinal step and the subsequent pivot and ordinal steps. i-th ordinal step for i ≥ 1: We remove s i from OB i−1 . Now there will be a column j in OB i−1 \ {s i } with two row-minima. Suppose that j had a row-minimum in row k in OB i−1 , so currently q(j ) = k, and let l denote the new row where the element of column j is also minimal in submatrix OB i−1 \ {s i }. Let us reset q(j ) = l. Now we will add a new column t i in such a way that t i will have a row-minimum in row k and the row-minimal elements of the other columns remain the same, formally, let t i be the column such that C k,t i is maximal under the restriction that C q(j ),j < C q(j ),t i for each j ∈ OB i−1 \ {s i }. Let then OB i = (OB i−1 \ {s i }) ∪ {t i } and q(t i ) = k. If FB i = OB i then the algorithm terminates.
Initial ordinal step:
As Scarf [22] showed this process is well-defined and terminates in finite time if no degeneracy occurs. To avoid degeneracy, besides having different values in every row of C, vector b representing the vertex-bounds should be also perturbed (see more about this issue in [4] ).
Finally, we illustrate the usage of the Scarf algorithm for a particular instance of HRC.
Example
The example in Fig. 1 We can describe this problem as an instance of ISA, where the individual applicants, the couples and the hospitals are represented by vertices, and each hyperedge corresponds to an application (either to an individual application or to a joint application). 
However, by
, where p i is the i-th prime number, 6 we obtained
which corresponds to the unique stable matching for this instance, namely
Therefore this example also illustrates that different perturbations may result in different stable allocations with the possibility that some of them are integral and some are fractional solutions.
Experimental comparison of heuristics
In the redesign of the NRMP, Roth and Peranson [20] constructed a heuristic method that incorporates the admission of couples. Motivated by the redesign of the Scottish resident allocation scheme, Biró et al. [5] implemented some more complex heuristics and compared them with some variants of the Roth-Peranson method. We also implemented the Scarf algorithm, and used it as a new heuristic to solve HRC, as described in the previous section. We conducted simulations on the same instances that Biró et al. [5] studied (see Table II . in their paper). But we shall note that the Scarf algorithm was implemented in a different platform and so we did not compare its running time with the other heuristics studied in [5] . For each run of the Scarf algorithm we used one perturbation only. (It is question for future research whether different perturbations can result in significantly different stable allocations for random or structured instances). Table 1 summarises our findings. In this experiment there were 500 residents and the proportion of couples varied from 5 % to 100 %. 7 For each proportion of couples there were 1000 random instances generated and we counted how many instances each variant could solve. We remark that we do not know how many of these random instances were actually solvable. Note also that for the set of heuristics by Biró et al. [5] the results given in the table are not for a single heuristic, but they are always for the heuristic which performed best on the corresponding set of parameter values.
The table shows that the heuristics by Biró et al. [5] obtained a much better success ratio than the Roth-Peranson heuristics, especially for high proportions of couples. But surprisingly, the Scarf-algorithm was much better than the others when (almost) all the applicants form couples. As we have already noted, this situation occurs in some applications, such as the Hungarian higher education matching scheme (where many applicants apply for a pair of studies).
For completeness, we also included some statistics for those instances that the extended Scarf algorithm could not solve. In particular, we listed how many times the Scarf heuristic returned half-integer solutions (these may be interpreted as half-time contracts), and for how many instances the solution contained only one, two, three, four or five fractional weights. The latter properties of the fractional solutions indicate how far they were from being integral. In particular, having one single fractional weight in a stable allocation must imply that a combined application has half weight, meaning that these two residents would get two half-time jobs in a hospital. In this case, if we would omit the couple and reduce the capacity of that hospital by one then the remaining matching would be stable for the reduced instance.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we showed how the original Scarf algorithm may be used as a successful heuristic for solving the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples, which is a relevant problem in many practical applications. There are still a number of interesting questions that would be worth investigating as extensions to our work presented. How does the Scarf algorithm work for the particular case of HRC? Is there some more efficient way to run this algorithm for HRC than the original matrix method? What are the possible effects of the perturbations used in the Scarf algorithm? If the Scarf algorithm returns a fractional solution, can we approximate an integral solution from that? Very recently Nguyen and Vohra [17] showed how the existence of a stable matching can be guaranteed for adjusted quotas in a version of the HRC problem and its extensions. Their proof is based on a rounding technique which starts with a fractional stable solution and returns an integral stable solution for a new instance with adjusted quotas.
We also believe that the stable allocation problem with contributions may accommodate many further relevant problems, and so the Scarf algorithm and its extensions are worth considering as heuristics for solving other problems as well.
